We explore the impact of non-collusive corruption on factor rewards and on the wealth distribution. We show that the distributional consequences depend crucially on the degree of capital market imperfections.
Introduction
In its recent World Development Report on poverty the World Bank emphasizes that corruption is one of the major obstacles in the fight against poverty in the developing world. Indeed, recent empirical work by Li et al. (2000) has found that corruption hampers growth and increases inequality. Mauro (1995) has found a negative association between corruption and investment. Friedman et al. (2000) provide evidence that greater corruption and a large unofficial economy go hand in hand.
In the light of its adverse effects on economic performance and poverty reduction in the developing world it is astonishing that extensive corruption is so persistent in many of the low-income countries. Why is a corrupt bureaucracy not fought by a government exactly appointed to do so? There might be a simple reason if corruption is mutually beneficial between the official and his client.
As Bardhan (1997) underlines, neither the official nor the private agent has an incentive to report or protest in that case. This means that collusive corruption is insidious and difficult to detect and therefore likely to be persistent. However, corruption is often not mutually beneficial between the official and the private agent but imposes additional costs in particular on firms. Rose-Ackerman (1999, p. 15-7) reviews anecdotal evidence showing that non-collusive corruption, i.e. corruption that benefits only the dishonest officials, 1 increases the costs of engaging in economic activity dramatically.
2 In Section 2 we show that this kind of corruption is pervasive throughout the less developed world.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the forces behind persistent corruption without theft from a theoretical point of view. We explore distributional consequences of this kind of corruption in an economy where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their wealth but are otherwise identical. In par-1 Corruption without theft (from the government) in the terminology of Shleifer and Vishny (1993) . Henceforth "corruption without theft" and "non-collusive corruption" are treated as synonyms.
2 For instance, in St. Petersburg in 1992 firms had to pay USD 200 in irregular "additional payments" for a telephone installation (Webster and Charap, 1993) . ticular, we analyse the impact of bribery on individual investment opportunities and on aggregate variables such as the equilibrium interest rate and the wealth distribution. So far, the literature has neglected the distributional consequences of corruption via its impact on factor rewards. However, in our view, it is central to analyse who has to back the costs of corruption after taking into account the general equilibrium effects. If the burden of corruption is unequally distributed, individuals or groups in society face different incentives to fight against corruption.
Our model focuses on non-collusive corruption taking place between firms and lower-level bureaucracy. We assume that an entrepreneur has to pay bribes to set up a business whereas poorer individuals who engage in a "backyard project" or deposit their money on a savings account are not subject to bribery.
The total bribe to be paid by an entrepreneur increases absolutely in the project size but decreases relatively to the project size. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that the direct burden of corruption is rather unequally distributed and falls disproportionately on entrepreneurs belonging to the "middle class".
Corruption lowers the return on all investment opportunities to the same extent and, consequently, each individual bears the same relative burden. However, things change substantially if individual borrowing is limited due to imperfect enforcement of credit contracts. We show that poorer individuals and especially the "middle class" bear a big share of the burden imposed by dishonest officials.
Thus, the distributional pattern mentioned above is enforced once we take into account macroeconomic effects. Second, we identify a group of individuals other than the bureaucrats that even win from a higher degree of corruption because the benefits emerging through macroeconomic channels overcompensate the direct costs of paying a bribe. This group consists of the wealthy entrepreneurs.
The results are driven by the fact that corruption reduces the ex ante wealth of potential entrepreneurs. If capital markets are imperfect, wealth serves as a collateral determining how much can be borrowed in the capital market. Thus, a higher level of bribery reduces the wealth that can serve as collateral and hence limits the access to the capital market. Some members of the "middle class" are no longer able to finance the minimum investment required to set up a business. Hence, capital demand decreases which in turn lowers the interest rate. Whereas the poor and the "middle class" lose, the lower interest rate favours the wealthy entrepreneurs despite the fact that each member of this group faces a direct adverse effect of corruption on his investment return.
If the privileged class governs both the private and the public sector, we may interpret corruption without theft as a particular form of rent-seeking. Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) provide evidence that in countries with weak democratic institutions the government is indeed "captured" by the rich. 4 Thus, focusing on the interaction between weak democratic institutions and weak market institutions, this paper identifies another mechanism by which inequality may promote redistribution and affect efficiency. In this sense, our work is linked to Perotti (1993) , Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , and Persson and Tabellini (1994) who investigate the effects of inequality on the demand for fiscal redistribu-4 Bénabou (2000) argues that even in democratic societies effective political power is correlated with wealth.
tion, and to Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) , who argue that high inequality -by triggering social unrest, mass violence, and civil wars -endangers property rights and discourages investment by the rich. In our model, however, rent-seeking takes place in exactly the opposite way. The rich redistribute from the poor on condition that political and economic power are positively associated. Thus, our work is most closely related to Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2002) who argue that high inequality allows the wealthy to subvert legal institutions for their own benefit.
At a broader level, this paper is related to a literature underlining that existing powerful groups may block the introduction of new technologies because they fear the loss of political power Robinson, 2000, 2002) or of economic rents (e.g. Olson, 1982, or Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1996) .
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss shortly different types of corruption and provide evidence showing that non-collusive corruption is pervasive in the less developed world. In addition, we argue that the perception of corruption is strongly influenced by the level of non-collusive corruption. Section 3 sets up the basic model and examines the static market equilibrium. The distributional consequences of corruption are explored in Section 4. We distinguish explicitly the cases of perfect and imperfect capital markets and state our two main results. In Secton 5 we briefly discuss an extension of the static model in which both aggregate savings and the dynamics of the wealth distribution are endogenous. We argue that corruption hampers growth and polarizes the wealth distribution. In Section 6, we present cross-country correlations between the change in inequality and the level of corruption. Section 7 concludes.
2 Types of Corruption Shleifer and Vishny (1993) distinguish between two types of corruption. First, in the case without theft (from the government), the official does not hide the transaction with a private agent and passes the transaction's price -if there is one -to the government but charges something extra for himself. This means that the official imposes additional costs on the private agent. A well-known and striking example for corruption without theft is Peru in the early eighties.
As described by De Soto (1989) , there were eleven requirements for setting up a small industry. In an experiment, a potential entrepreneur was asked for additional, irregular payments on ten occasions. On two of these occasions, the entrepreneur was forced to pay the bribe since there was no other way to complete the procedure and to continue. Second, in the case with theft, the official does not turn over anything to the government at all, and hides the transaction. This kind of corruption is mutually beneficial as long as the bribes demanded are smaller than the price required by the government.
Many authors, among them Shleifer and Vishny (1993 , p. 604) and Bardhan (1997 , p. 1334 , argue that we should expect collusive corruption to be more persistent than non-collusive since in the case with theft the interests of the official and the private agent are aligned and neither the briber nor the bribee has an incentive to protest. In addition, collusive corruption often benefits an influential group in society. For instance, evidence for Gambia, Mozambique, and Ghana suggests that corruption with theft permits the rich to avoid taxes (Dia, 1996) .
What does the data say with respect to the persistence of non-collusive corruption? There are essentially two problems in answering this question. First, we have to rely on the perception of corruption since there is no objective data on the extent of any kind of corruption. This gives rise to our second problem.
Leading corruption perceptions indices (e.g. the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index [TI-CPI]) do not explicitly deal with collusive or non-collusive corruption. 5 Hence, we are not able to make a sound judgement about the persistence of non-collusive corruption from an empirical point of view.
However, there exists some evidence for the extent of non-collusive corruption for the time being. In its attempt to measure "Conditions for Business Operation and Growth", the World Bank (2002) recently asked over 10,000 firms in 80 countries questions about corruption. Beside the general question about the impact of corruption on the "operation and growth of the business" ("no obstacle", "minor obstacle", "moderate obstacle", "major obstacle"), more detailed questions were asked. Inter alia, firm managers where asked first whether it is common for firms in their line of business to have to pay some irregular "additional payments" to get things done, and second, after having done the "additional payment", whether another governmental official will subsequently require an "additional payment" for the same service. As a third question, firm managers had to specify, when doing business with the government, how much of the contract value a firm in their industry would typically offer in additional or unofficial payments to secure the contract.
In pursuing corruption along the lines of the first and second question, an official steals from private firms and not from the government because he asks for irregular "additional payments" to provide a governmental service. Thus, the responses ("always", "mostly", "frequently", "sometimes", "seldom", "never") to these questions mirror the extent of non-collusive corruption. In contrast, the responses to the third question ("zero", "up to 5 %", "6 to 10 %", "11 to 15 %", "16 to 20 %", "more than 20 %") predict something about the level of corruption with theft. It is well known that corruption in the awarding of major contracts inflates the costs of public projects. Therefore, it seems convenient to subsume this type of corruption under corruption with theft. As a plausible measure for non-collusive (collusive) corruption in a given country we propose the share of firms responding "never" or "seldom" ("zero" or "up to 5 %").
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To construct a measure for the impact of corruption on the "operation and growth of the business", World Bank attaches 1 to "no obstacle", 2 to "minor obstacle", an so on, and then takes the average. As can be seen from Table 1, non-collusive corruption is pervasive in the less developed regions of the world.
In addition, countries with a high level of non-collusive corruption are also those in which firm managers indicate that corruption is an obstacle to the operation and growth of their business: Spearman's rank correlation between the measure for the impact of corruption on the "operation and growth of the business" and our measure for non-collusive corruption is about 0.78. The correlation between the measure for the general impact of corruption and our measure for collusive corruption is significantly smaller: 0.69.
T able 1
It is also worth noting that the correlation between our simple measure of Table 2 ). Additional correlations are given in Table 3 . These correlations are evidence supporting the view that there is a close relationship between the perception of corruption as, for instance, reported in the TI-CPI and the extent of non-collusive corruption.
T able 2, T able 3
We conclude that in a huge number of countries throughout the developing world non-collusive corruption is on a persistent high level. In addition, the perception of corruption seems to be highly influenced by the extent of this kind of corruption. The empirical evidence for the negative impact of perceived corruption on investment and growth in mind (Section 1), we hypothesize that primarily non-collusive corruption imposes strong restrictions on economic activity and development.
In what follows we argue that the persistence of non-collusive corruption may be rooted in its distributional properties. We show that, beside the officials, corruption without theft also favours non-officials on condition that bribery follows the regressive pattern reported by Clarke and Xu (2002) and that capital markets are poorly developed. Thus, corruption without theft may be interpreted as rent-seeking leading to redistribution from the relatively poor to the rich.
However, the winners of corruption are not rewarded directly, as it is the case with collusive corruption, but through general equilibrium channels.
3 The model
The Basic Assumptions
We consider a closed economy that is populated by a large number (a contin- An agent has two different physical investment opportunities. First, he may invest his wealth endowment into a "backyard project". This yields a return (output per unit of capital invested) of r ≥ 1. Second, he may become an entrepreneur and may invest k units consisting of his own wealth and, possibly, borrowed funds into an "investment project" which yields a return of R > r ≥ 1.
Beside these physical investment opportunities, an agent may become a lender on an economy-wide capital market. The endogenously determined interest rate is ρ. Note that, in equilibrium, ρ must be at least as high as r because of the existence of the "backyard project".
To succeed, an entrepreneur has to invest an amount that is higher than some specific threshold level. In addition, he has to undertake bureaucratic procedures that can only be completed by paying bribes to lower-level officials.
In particular, we take the following two assumptions: First, there is a minimum requirement of one unit of capital to start an "investment project". With a lower level of input, the project will not generate any returns. Second, the entrepreneur has to pay corruption fees. These corruption fees serve only to get a de iure costless business licence. They do not favour a particular investor compared to another investor who pays the fees as well. That is, we focus on corruption without theft in the terminology of Shleifer and Vishny (1993) . To summarize, after having paid the bribes to the officials, the entrepreneur is free to invest. If he invests an amount of k ≥ 1 into the "investment project", the gross output is Rk. If he invests less than one unit, the project output is zero.
Neither a minimum investment nor a "business licence" is required in the case of the low yield "backyard project".
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The total bribe to be paid depends on the project size k and is given by To close the model, we assume that all bribe collecting officials are lenders and do not act as entrepreneurs.
If an agent with initial wealth w < k desires to invest k units of capital, he has to borrow on the economy-wide capital market. The capital market is competitive in the sense that the individuals take the equilibrium interest rate ρ as given. However, there is a capital market imperfection due to imperfect enforcement of credit contracts. 8 An entrepreneur may refuse to honour his payment obligation. We assume that an entrepreneur can seize a fraction 1 − λ of the project output if he avoids the payment obligation. The parameter λ ≤ 1 can be interpreted as a measure for the capital market efficiency. In our simple model, capital market efficiency depends directly on the effectiveness of the legal system. For example, a λ of zero means that default is never followed by a sanction whereas in the case λ = 1 the enforcement of credit contracts is perfect and the capital market is as well. Taking into account the entrepreneurial incentives, the lenders will give additional credit to an entrepreneur (that is to an individual who invests into the "investment project") as long as it is in the enterpreneur's own interest to repay the debt. This will be the case if the payment obligation ρc, where c is the total amount of credit, does not exceed the cost of default λRk for the enterpreneur. Hence, an entrepreneur investing k units of capital gets a maximum credit c max of λR ρ k capital units. Note that in equilibrium default will not occur. The capital market is imperfect because it is possible to default.
The Static Equilibrium
The existence of the capital market imperfection implies that the maximum project size depends positively on the wealth endowment w. Suppose that an entrepreneur wants to invest k units of capital into an "investment project".
Since the entrepreneur has to pay the bribes first, the own capital w(k) required is determined by
Taking c max = λR ρ k into account, we get
It is clear that w
, must be greater than zero in equilibrium. Suppose the opposite were true. In this case, w(k) is equal to zero (if w 0 = 0) or becomes negative if k grows large (if w 0 < 0).
This means that every individual has unlimited access to the capital market.
Given the assumption w 0 (k) ≤ 0, ρ must be smaller than λR < R. This means that everyone seeks to invest an infinite sum and, as a consequence, capital demand exceeds capital supply. This cannot be an equilibrium. We conclude that w 0 (k) > 0, and that own capital plays the role of collateral in our model.
Equation (1) allows us to determine the minimum wealth level w(1) ≡w 1 that enables an individual to invest exactly one unit of capital:
All individuals with initial wealth w >w 1 are able to become an entrepreneur.
The intuition of (2) is easy to grasp. The amount that an enterpreneur can borrow is given by c max = λR ρ k. A higher interest rate ρ, a lower capital market efficiency λ, and a lower project return R reduce c max . Thus, the cutoff-level to become an entrepreneur must rise in ρ and fall in λ and in R. A higher total bribe βb(1) translates one-to-one in an increase ofw 1 since the bribes must be paid before the project starts.
It remains to determine, however, whether an individual with wealthw 1 wants to become an entrepreneur at all. An individual with w ≥w 1 chooses the "occupation" entrepreneur if both of the two alternative opportunities, that are (i) investing into a "backyard project" or (ii) acting as a lender, are less attractive in terms of the investment return or, equivalently, in terms of the resulting ex post wealth. The resulting ex post wealth of not choosing entrepreneurship is given by w max{ρ, r} = wρ since ρ ≥ r in an equilibrium. An entrepreneur who borrows the maximum amount of credit earns the gross return Rk and has to repay ρc
Note that k is strictly increasing and convex in w and strictly decreasing in ρ (see Appendix). The ex post wealth W E (w, ρ, β) of an entrepreneur is then given by
and is also strictly increasing and convex in w. Now, we are ready to determine the critical wealth levelw 2 where an individual is exactly indifferent between an "investment project" and one of the two alternatives. If we solve W E (w 2 , ρ, β) = ρw 2 , we getw
Intuitively, a higher ρ, an uppward shift of the bribe function, or a lower R make entrepreneurship less favourable. As a consequnece,w 2 must rise. If λ, our measure for capital market efficiency, rises an entrepreneur can borrow more capital and therefore manage larger project sizes. This makes entrepreneurship more attractive as long as R > ρ. Thus,w 2 falls in λ.
The following lemma shows that
This implies that (for individuals with initial wealth w ≥ max{w 1 ,w 2 }) it is indeed optimal to invest the whole initial wealth endowment plus the maximum amount of credit into an "investment project". The other agents will become lenders (if ρ > r ) or are indifferent between investing into a "backyard project"
or becoming lenders (if ρ = r).
Lemma 1 Additional wealth is more valuable for an entrepreneur than for a lender: ∂W E (w, ρ, β)/∂w ≥ ρ with strict inequality if b 00 < 0.
Proof. We show first that W E (w, ρ, β) is strictly increasing and convex
> 0 since the denominator is positive for k ∈ [1, ∞) and λ < 1. Since b 00 ≤ 0, the ex post wealth W E of an entrepreneur is convex in w and strictly convex in w, if b 00 < 0.
Let us consider first the case wherew 1 ≥w 2 . In that case W E (w 1 ) ≥ ρw 1 holds. Using (2) and (3) this condition can be rewritten: With this result we get:
Now, let us consider the casew 2 >w 1 . Since W E (w) is convex, it must cross the ρw−line from below at w =w 2 . Thus, the claim of the lemma immediately
follows.
Figure 1 below shows the relationship between the endowment w and the resulting ex post wealth of an individual. Ifw 1 >w 2 , the borrowing constraint determines who is to become an entrepreneur. Figure 1a shows that the ex post wealth rises discontinuously atw 1 . In the case ofw 2 ≥w 1 (Figure 1b ), an agent with wealthw 2 is indifferent between the two "occupations" entrepreneur and lender. From Lemma 1 we know that an additional unit of initial wealth increases the ex post wealth of an entrepreneur to a larger extent than the ex post wealth of a lender:
The reason is that a higher wealth weakens the borrowing constraint and allows larger projects seizes k financed by "cheap" capital. Thus, under imperfect capital markets, each individual wants to invest an infinite sum into the entrepreneurial project. However, this is not possible due to the enforcement problems. To which extent an individual can take advantage of the favourable borrowing conditions depends on its own wealth.
We complete our description of the static equilibrium by deriving the (gross) capital demand function and the (gross) capital supply function. Gross capital
is simply the sum of all entrepreneurial project sizes. Since the project size k(w, ρ, β) of an entrepreneur with initial wealth w is implicitely
{w − βb(k)} , the gross capital demand relation of the economy can be written as
If λ < 1, K D is uniformly falling in the interest rate ρ because the maximum project size k decreases in the interest rate. Gross capital supply K S is equal to the aggregate wealth endowment R ∞ 0 wg(w)dw =:K as long as ρ > r. In the case of ρ > r, nobody will choose to invest into a "backyard project" and the economy-wide stock of capital is allocated to high yield "investment projects".
In the case of ρ = r, a lender is indifferent between investing into a "backyard project" or putting the money on a savings account. Finally, if ρ < r, capital supply will, of course, be zero. Hence, the gross capital supply curve K S is a horizontal line at ρ = r and is vertical for ρ > r at the capital levelK (see Figure 2 ). 9 The intersection of the capital demand and capital supply curve in Figure 2 determines the unique equilibrium interest rate ρ * of the economy.
It is also important to mention that capital market imperfections redistribute wealth from the lenders to the entrepreneurs even without the presence of corruption (β = 0). However,w 1 and k are determined solely by the minimum investment requirement and the capital supply. They do not depend on λ since a variation in λ leads to the same relative variation in ρ in the new equilibrium.
This means, for example, that a fall in λ neither affect the number of the entrepreneurs nor the size of their projects. Redistribution takes place but only through the channel of lower capital costs for fixed project sizes. 
Perfect Capital Markets (λ = 1)
Under perfect capital markets we have to distinguish two cases. First, assume that b(k) is regressive. In that case a single investment fund will collect the whole credit supply in order to minimize the bribes paid per capital unit. The fund invests the whole capital in the economy. Note that such a pooling institution cannot exist as long as λ < 1 because a single individual or a institution can borrow only up to a finite sum due to the enforcement problems. Since b(k) is defined over individual project sizes (with mass zero) the fund has to pay an amount of lim Note that an increase in β does not affect efficiency as long as corruption is
Figure 3: Impact of higher bribery on the interest rate not at a "very high" level, i.e. as long as R 1+ lim k→∞ βb 0 (k) ≥ r which means that the economy-wide capital stock is invested into high yield "investment projects".
Imperfect Capital Markets (λ < 1)
So far, we discussed briefly the distributional consequences of capital market imperfections (Section 3) and of corruption in an economy with perfect capital markets (Subsection 4.1). In this section, we explore the distributional consequences of corruption in an economy with imperfect capital markets. We show that in the case ρ * > r more corruption alters the number of entrepreneurs and, through its impact on the interest rate, redistributes also wealth within the group of non-officials. In contrast, if ρ * = r an increase in the level of corruption does no longer redistribute wealth within the private sector.
It is easy to see that the direct impact of corruption on the entrepreneurial wealth is adverse. But, as mentioned above, there is a second, macroeconomic channel operating through the interest rate. Figure 3a shows the effect of a higher β on the interest rate.
Proposition 2 If λ < 1 and ρ * > r, the equilibrium interest rate falls in the level of corruption β.
Proof. Formally, the effect of bribery on the interest rate ρ can be determined by computing dρ dβ from equation (5), taking into account that K D =K = const. However, it is more convenient to prove the claim by contradiction.
Assume that dρ dβ ≥ 0. In this case, bothw 1 andw 2 are increasing in β since more capital is needed to become an entrepreneur and the interest rate alters in favour of the lenders ( dw 1 dβ and dw 2 dβ are given in the Appendix). This means that the number of entrepreneurs falls in β for sure. In addition, the project sizes of the remaining entrepreneurs decrease as well. But this cannot be an equilibrium because aggregate capital allocated to "investment projects" is constant as long as ρ * > r. We conclude that dρ dβ < 0. The channel operating through the interest rate affects both the wealth of the lenders and the wealth of the entrepreneurs. It is clear that the lower interest rate hurts all lenders, i.e. all individuals with initial wealth below max{w 1 ,w 2 } in the new equilibrium. This means that a general equilibrium effect shifts bribe costs partially to the lenders. At the same time, capital costs for the remaining entrepreneus are going down. In contrast to the perfect capital market case, the macroeconomic effect works in favour of the remaining entrepreneurs. Consequently, only the impact of bribery on the ex post wealth of both the "new" and the "old" lenders is unambiguous. Figure 3a shows the effect of a higher β on the interest.
In the following exposition we explore the conditions under which an entrepreneur benefits from a higher level of corruption, i.e. the conditions under which the general equilibrium effect overcompensates the direct negative effect of higher bribery. We proceed in two steps. First, we show how the number of entrepreneurs depends on β. This is done in Lemma 2 below. Then, we are ready to state and prove our main results (Proposition 3).
Lemma 2 A higher level of corruption β increases the critical wealth level to become an entrepreneurw 1 . In addition,w 2 increases in β if the bribe function is "enough" regressive.
Proof. We first prove that dβ is always positive at w =w 2 (see Appendix),w 2 increases in β if
Note that the inequality at the end of the above proof is likely to be fulfilled if (i) the marginal bribe at k(w old 2 , ·) is relatively small compared to the average bribe and (ii) the interest rate does not decrease to a large extent in β. The intuition is as follows. Since k(w old 2 , ·) falls for sure in the new equilibrium, the marginal bribe determines how much the total bribe decreases due to this reduction in the project size. On the other hand, the higher the average bribe costs are, the stronger is the absolute increase in the bribe costs due to a higher β. So, in case of an increase in β, the combination of a high average bribe and a small marginal bribe reduces the attractiveness of the entrepreneurial project strongly. This reduction must be compared to the reduction in the interest rate, i.e. to the reduction in the return of the alternative investment opportunity. If ρ does not fall to a great extent, the individual with initial wealthw old 2 switches from the "occupation" entrepreneur to the "occupation" lender andw new 2 >w old 2 . In addition, note thatw 2 may only decrease locally in β. Sincew 1 rises as β increases, the threshold levelw 2 cannot steadily decrease because otherwise the conditionw 1 <w 2 will be violated eventually.
Proposition 3 (i). Ifw 1 ≥w 2 orw 1 <w 2 and dw2 dβ ≥ 0, there exists a group of entrepreneurs with wealth level w >ŵ such that
(ii). In the case ofw 1 <w 2 and dw 2 dβ < 0, there exists a wealth level w such that
Proof. (i).
In that case, bothw 1 andw 2 are increasing in β. This means that a rise in the level of corruption leads to a smaller class of entrepreneurs.
Because total investment is fixed and dk dβ is positively associated with w, a nonzero mass of rich agents with w >ŵ will invest more. But this implies that their ex post wealth increases because W E (w) = (1 − λ)Rk (see equation (3)).
(ii). The expression for k(w2)(1+βb 0 (k(w2))) . To get a more intuitive expression note that
The former inequality stems form the fact that R − ρ(1 + βb 0 (k)) > 0 (see Appendix).
Therefore we can state the following sufficient condition: lim k→∞ dk dβ is positive if lim
It is worth noting that our analysis applies for a marginal increase in the corruption level form every starting level β ≥ 0. If we restrict our attention to the case in which corruption rises marginally from zero to some positive level, where we assume thatw 1 >w 2 (Figure 4a ) orw 2 >w 1 and dw 2 dβ > 0 ( Figure  4b ). An increase in β hurts (indirectly and only moderately) all individuals that have already been lenders before the rise in β. The wealthy entrepreneurs with wealth levels aboveŵ 1 (ŵ 2 ) in Figure 4a (figure 4b) are favoured. In contrast, the group consisting of individuals with initial wealth betweenw 1,0 andw 1,1 (w 2,0 andw 2,1 ) in Figure 4a (Figure 4b ) loses substantially. These individuals have been entrepreneurs before but act as lenders now. In Figure   4a (w 1 >w 2 ) the borrowing constraint becomes binding for members of the "middle class" whereas in Figure 4b (w 2 ≥w 1 ) it does no longer pay to become an entrepreneur. In addition, the remaining entrepreneurs incur substantial losses if their wealth is only slightly abovew 1 orw 2 , respectively. ρ * = r. The equilibrium interest rate equals its lower bound r if corruption is at a very high level. As β grows, the capital demand is shifting to the left and eventually crosses the capital supply curve in its flat region (figure 3b).
There are two main differences compared to the case discussed above. First, the distributional consequences of higher corruption change. If β rises, the interest rate is unaffected, hence the lenders do not suffer from higher corruption. The costs are fully borne by the enterpreneurs' class. The members of this class have to pay higher total bribes but the interest rate does no longer change in their favour. This means that their access to the capital market has worsened and that the project sizes are generally reduced. Thus, each remaining entrepreneur experiences a loss irrespective of his wealth. Since the poor lenders gain in relative terms, overall inequality tends to fall. So, our model predicts that there is a hump-shaped relationship between the level of corruption and inequality.
Second, the capital invested in the modern sector decreases sincew 1 and w 2 increase in β, i.e. the number of entrepreneurs is smaller than before, and the project size is in general reduced. Thus, bribery negatively affects output.
In the case discussed above, the total amount of capital allocated in the high return projects is constant because capital supply is inelastic for ρ * > r (see figure 3a) . With ρ * = r, higher corruption crowds out investments from the high yield "investment sector" to the low yield "backyard sector" (see Figure   3b ).
The discussion so far was close to our basic model that includes two polar cases with respect to capital supply. Either gross capital supply is vertical or horizontal. However, we may also shortly and only informally consider a situation where capital supply is positively sloped due to, for instance, imperfect international capital mobility. The distributional consequences in this case lie in between the two polar cases. For a given increase in the level of corruption, the interest rate falls ceteris paribus less when capital supply is elastic. In addition, aggregate investment into the high return investment project falls but only to a relatively small extent compared to the case with perfectly elastic supply.
Exactly this impact of elastic supply not only makes it less likely that rich individuals win from more corruption but also protects the poor form backing a large part of the additional bribe costs.
Endogenous Savings
In this Section we extend our model to analyse the impact of corruption on both the dynamics of the output and the wealth distribution. For ease of exposition, we consider a two-period model. In their first period of life, individuals (exogenously) inherit a wealth endowment and have simultaneously to take two decisions. First, individuals have to choose between becoming an entrepreneur (E ) or staying a lender (L). Second, they have to decide on how much to save out of their ex post wealth. The savings of the first period will be the initial wealth in the following period. In this second period, the agents are again forced to choose their "occupation". However, there is no longer savings-decision. The entire ex post wealth is consumed. Note that, in the aggregate, higher savings translate directly into a higher growth rate since the technology was assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale with respect to capital.
We assume that all individuals have the same logarithmic utility function
where c t stands for consumption at date t. The parameter θ < 1 denotes the discount factor. Since the individuals may change their "occupation" in the second period, there are four different "career paths". To determine which path an individual selects, we have to state the intertemporal budget constraint for each possible case. For simplicity, we assume that the total bribe is a fixed amount, i. e. that the bribes do not vary with project size. Denote by b t and b t+1 the total bribe in period t and t+1, respectively. 10 For ease of notation, the interest rate for entrepreneurs in t is defined by ρ
Note that this rate of return does not vary across entrepreneurs (as it was the case above) since the marginal bribe is zero. The budget constraints associated with the four different "career paths" are given in equation (6). An individual who has, for instance, chosen to become an entrepreneur (E ) in the first period and to become a lender (L) in the second period faces the budget constraint denoted by (EL). 1 . An individual will decide in favour of E if ρ E t (w t − b t ) is large enough such that the marginal utility out of consumption today is not "much larger" than marginal utility out of consumption tomorrow. In Figure   5a , the decision problem for an individual exactly indifferent between E and L in the second period (w = w * t ) is shown. The indifference curve crosses the budget constraint in the point where savings =w t+1 1 , and is tangent to the budget constraint in another point where savings <w t+1 1 . Note that the income expansion path (IEP) follows a very unusual pattern because of the nonconvexity of the budget set. In particular, there exists a wealth range in which the IEP is horizontal. If w t equals w * t or is slightly above w * t , every additional unit of ex post wealth (due to an increase in w t ) is spent on consumption today because, in a corner solution, marginal utility of consumption today is higher than optimal consumption smoothing would imply: From Proposition 4 we conclude that the equilibrium "occupation structure" may take three forms. First, there may be a full segregation equilibrium, i.e. only (EE ) and (LL) arise. This means that the number of entrepreneurs (lenders) does not change from the first to the second period since nobody changes the "occupation". This equilibrium can only occur ifw t 1 >w t 2 , 11 and is more likely if ρ E t is high compared to ρ t . Second, there may be an equilibrium in which a positive mass of agents switches form L to E in the second period.
Hence, there are more entrepreneurs in the second period than in the first one.
In the third possible equilibrium, some agents choose (EL) such that there are less entrepreneurs in the second period. For each of the possible equilibria, the impact of corruption on aggregate savings is now discussed.
Full segregation. We start with the case in which only the "career-paths" (LL) and (EE ) may emerge in equilibrium. As mentioned above, this is only possible if corruption is on a relatively low level and, consequently, the minimum investment restriction is binding. Let's also assume for a short time that every entrepreneur is in an interior optimum, i.e. that nobody consumes on the horizontal part of the income expansion path. This regime serves us as a baseline case. If all entrepreneurs are in an interior optimum, their consumption growth is given by the Euler equation
θ. For lenders and officials, consumption growth is given by ct+1 ct = ρ t+1 θ. Inserting the Euler equations into the budget constraints (6) allows us to solve for the first-period consumption:
Note that the interest rate in the second period does not enter since income and substitution effects cancel out each other due to logarithmic instantaneous utility. Aggregate output, which is equal to the sum of the income going to the entrepreneurs, to the officials, and to the lenders, is given by
11 Ifw t 1 <w t 2 , the separation equilibrium occurs also if ρw t 2 happens to equal max{w t+1 1 ,w t+1 2 }. However, we abstract from this very unlikely case.
Thus, aggregate consumption is given by
In a two-period setting, aggregate consumption does not depend on the level of corruption. Higher bribery (at date t or t + 1) increases consumption of the officials but decreases at the same time consumption of the entrepreneurs. Since consumers have logarithmic instantaneous utility, the change in interest rates per se does not affect present savings and present consumption since income and substitution effects cancel each other. However, higher corruption implies a negative (positive) wealth effect for the entrepreneurs (the officials). On the one hand, the entrepreneurs will reduce their consumption because they have to pay higher bribes. On the other hand, the officials will increase consumption. In a two period setting, the two effects exactly cancel out each other. If individuals live for more than two periods, for instance three periods, the wealth effect of more corruption will be smaller for entrepreneurs than for officials in absolute terms. To see this formally, compare the intertemporal budget constraint for the entrepreneurs and the officials, respectively.
Since the interest rate is higher for entrepreneurs than for officials, the change in the discounted value of future bribes is lower for entrepreneurs than for the officials:
. Hence, the officials increase their consumption stronger than the enrepreneurs their savings.
We now relax the assumption that all entrepreneurs are in their interior optimum and allow for individuals finding themselves on the flat part of the income expansion path (IEP) in Figure 5a above. These entrepreneurs save exactly the amountw t+1 1 that is needed to maintain the "occupation" in period t+1.
12 As long as they do not choose L in the second period, these entrepreneurs 12 Their first period consumption is given by ct = ρ E t (wt − bt) −
respectively. The minimum project size is one in both periods.
strongly reduce consumption in order to keep the savings constant atw t+1 1 if b t+1 increases. Hence, they decrease consumption much more than the officials increase their consumption. Thus, this "threshold effect" induces more corruption to increase savings.
Changes in class sizes. We now turn to the regime where, in equilibrium, some agents do not choose the same "occupation" in the second period. In this case, there exist individuals who are indifferent between the "occupations" E and L in the second period. In contrast to the discussion above, a change in the level of corruption tomorrow will induce agents to switch from L to E (less corruption) or vice versa (more corruption).
Assume that a higher b t+1 unambigously increasesw t+1 2 . In this case, more corruption decreases the number of entrepreneurs in the second period for sure.
This has an important impact on aggregate savings. Consider the agents who would have chosen E before but now, under a higher level of corruption, prefer being lender in the second period. This class of individuals decreases savings and increases first period consumption although bribes are no longer paid. This effect unambigously decreases aggregate savings. So, the "crowding-out effect" points exactly in the opposite direction than the "threshold effect". We see that, from a theoretical point of view, it is a priori not clear whether corruption reduces growth if capital markets are imperfect and the technology is characterized by non-convexities. If there is little corruption and, consequently, the minimum investment restriction is binding, an increase in the level of bribery generates two competing effects. On the one hand, more corruption reduces savings because individuals, who would have saved a lot to become entrepreneurs before, are crowded out. In a multi-period setting, savings are reduced even more because the remaining entrepreneurs discount the future bribes stronger than the officials. On the other hand, a "middle-class entrepreneur" who saves exactlyw t+1 1 to become an entrepreneur in the second period (and still does so even after the increase in b t+1 ) will reduce his first period consumption strongly as bribery increases. This "threshold effect" tends to increase aggregate savings. To deal with the problem of mutual causation, the level of corruption is measured (as an average) over the 1980-85 period whereas the change in the income share is measured from the second half of the eighties (first observation)
to the first half of the nineties (second observation). The gap between the two distribution observations is on average five years.
The country-sample is, in a first step, defined by the availability of detailed income distribution data in the late eighties and early nineties. To the best of our knowledge, there exist two data sets providing detail distribution data based on nationally-representative household surveys only. This are the Deininger and Squire (1996) data set from which we take the vast majority of our observations and the Milanovic (1999) data set. See Table 4 below for a detailed exposition on how our sample is constructed and also for some descriptive statistics. Running all the regression presented below based only on the Deininger and Squire data set leads to virtually the same results (not reported). Table 5 . Figure 6 plots the corruption level against the log of the per capita GDP. Table 6 provides information on the number of countries by regions.
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The further independent variables included in some of the OLS-regressions are (i) the average growth rate of the per capita GDP between the first and second observation (GROWTH), (ii) a measure for capital market imperfections (FINANCIAL), and (iii) a dummy variable (EXP) which is assumed to be 1 if inequality is measured based on expenditures rather than on income.
The growth of the per capita GDP may influence the income distribution through two different channels. First, there is a long-run effect. If we exclude the 9 poorest countries from the sample of the non-socialist countries, the income share of the richest part of the population decreases uniformly in the per capita GDP. We may hypothesize that a good deal of the countries included in our sample are on the decreasing part of the Kuznets-Curve. 13 However, this longrun effect must be quantitatively small since the average period is only five years.
Second, there are also "good reasons" to expect a relationship between shortrun fluctuations and the income distribution. The discussion has largely reached a consensus that the markups (price minus marginal costs) are countercyclical (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999) . In addition, low-skilled workers are more likely to lose their jobs during recession than high-skilled workers. We conclude that both the long-run and the short-run effect of growth tends to decrease the income share of the very rich in society. The growth data is based on Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) .
The second control variable on which a huge literature exists is the level of financial development. This literature underlines that persistent inequality or even an increasing polarization can be explained by the theory of imperfect credit. As a measure for the functioning of the financial system we use the variable "Credit to private sector (% of GDP)" provided by the World Bank (World Development Indicators, 2000) . This measure was introduced by King and Levine (1993) and accounts for the influence of capital market imperfections on the income distribution. 14 The data is averaged over 1980-85 period. The 13 In the sample consisting only of non-socialist countries, there is a strong Kuznets-type relationship between the log of the per capita GDP and the income share of the richest part of the population, even if we include a "Latin Dummy". Of course, this relationship can also be found in the whole sample if a "Socialist Dummy" is included. The countries to the left of the peak of the Kuznets-Curve are: Bangladesh, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Senegal. 14 For a detailed discussion of the advantages and drawbacks of this measure compared to literature on inequality and capital market imperfections and the implications of our model in mind, we expect to find a non-positive correlation between the functioning of the financial system and inequality.
Finally, the measurement dummy is included since, in a cross-section of individuals, measured (change in) inequality is higher using income as the measure than using expenditure due to consumption smoothing (Deininger and Squire, 1996) . Table 7 presents our main empirical findings. We run four regressions for both the full sample and a sample containing only non-socialist countries. In regression (1), we present the basic relationship between the change in the income share (p.a.) of the richest 20 % of the population and the level of perceived corruption. The correlation is both quantitatively and statistically significant.
In our full sample, a one standard deviation increase in the level of corruption In regression (3), CORRUPT is dropped but the measure for the capital market efficiency is included. The change in the income share of the richest part of the population is negatively related to the level of financial development.
Interestingly, if both CORRUPT and FINANCIAL are included (regression 4), the impact of the financial system is no longer significant whereas CORRUPT remains qualitatively and statistically significant. We conclude that the correlation between the level of financial development and the income share is mainly driven by the correlation between the level of corruption and the level of financial other ones see King and Levine (1993) , De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) , and Levine (1997) .
development.
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From our specification, one could infer that corruption leads to an ever increasing income share of the rich. However, one must take into account that the level of corruption will not necessarily be constant over time. In particular, the level may adjust endogenously to changes in the income share. Consequently, our results predict only that more corruption today may increase the inquality tomorrow.
Conclusions
Persistent non-collusive corruption is observed in many of the low-income countries. Empirical evidence suggests that this kind of corruption imposes huge costs on economic activity and redistributes wealth towards officials mainly serving in the lower-level bureaucracy. This distributional pattern seems puzzling at least for two reasons. First, it is hard to argue that non-collusive corruption benefits the politically powerful, e.g. government members or high-level officials, to a large extent. At the same time, economically powerful groups have to bear the direct costs. Second, recent history shows that governments are able to reduce corruption substantially by taking a major effort. So, why is there little reformist pressure from the private sector in many of the high-corruption countries?
We show that imperfections in the capital market may be key to understand this phenomenon. In our model, corruption without theft redistributes wealth also within the group of non-officials on condition that capital markets are imperfect. In particular, we find that each member of the "middle class" is hurt substantially whereas a poor individual loses little in relative terms. The rich entrepreneurs even win despite the fact that they bear a huge part of the direct costs of corruption.
We suggest that this distributional pattern helps to explain why there are only weak forces in society that fight for the installation of a honest bureaucracy.
Poor people are adversely affected but only moderately and through an indirect channel. Put slightly different, a reduction in corruption does not improve the position of the poor much since they are restricted by the capital market imperfection anyway. On the other hand, the rich understand that corruption without theft acts as a barrier to entry. Its reduction leads to more competition for credits on the capital market and increases the costs of capital. Only members of the "middle class" can gain a lot from a reduction in bribery. Lower bribes improve their access to the capital market and allow for entrepreneurship or make entrepreneurship more attractive for them. Given these distributional consequences, we expect the pressure on democratic governments as well as on authoritarian rulers to be smaller in societies characterized by a polarized wealth distribution and a small "middle class". In addition, attempts in this direction may be hindered or stopped by a coalition of wealthy individuals. Of course, this is more likely if economical power also means political power.
Our analysis focusses on the distributional consequence of corruption if capital markets are imperfect. However, there is a more general relationship between market imperfections, redistribution, and incentives to fight against corruption.
Suppose that the goods market is imperfect and that this goods market imperfection creates rents for the incumbents. If corruption acts as a barrier to entry such that more corruption restricts (endogenously) the number of competitors in a market, more corruption is also likely to redistribute wealth form the excluded entrepreneurs to the incumbents. Again, it may not be advantageous to powerful incumbents to remove this barrier to entry. Sources: Deininger and Squire (1996) and Milanovic (1999) ; Note: The year of the second observation is in general the most recent year for which detailed inequality data is available in the DS data set. The year of the first observation is then calculated by subtracting five years. If there is no DS data for this point in time, the closest year for which DS data is available is chosen. Only if there is no DS data for the late eighties and the early nineties, observations from the Milanovic data base are included. 
